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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
Objectives
The objectives of this guideline are to help the
auditor—
• Understand the variety of environments that
are included in the generic classification of
on-line.
• Identify the impact that the on-line environ
ment has on the auditor’s study and evalua
tion of the system of internal accounting con
trol.
• Identify the impact an on-line environment
may have on the nature, timing, and extent
of audit procedures.

This guideline is intended for use by the
independent auditor who has a basic under
standing of EDP accounting controls and EDP
concepts. The reader is expected to be familiar
with SAS no. 3, The Effects of EDP on the
Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Con
trol, and Audit Guides and Computer Services
Guidelines that deal with aspects of auditing in
computer environments. Relevant guides and
guidelines are listed in the bibliography.

Overview
An examination of financial statements for the
purpose of expressing an opinion includes a
proper study and evaluation of the client’s sys
tem of internal accounting control. SAS no. 1,
section 320.69, states that a conceptually logi
cal approach to the auditor’s evaluation of ac
counting control, which focuses directly on the
purpose of preventing or detecting material er
rors and irregularities in financial statements, is
to apply the following steps in considering
each significant class of transactions and re
lated assets involved in the audit;
1. Consider the type of errors and irregularities
that could occur.
2. Determine the accounting control proce
dures that should prevent or detect such
errors and irregularities.
3. Determine whether the necessary control
procedures have been prescribed and are
being followed satisfactorily.
4. Evaluate any weaknesses, that is, types of
potential errors and irregularities not cov
ered by existing control procedures, to de
termine their effect on (a) the nature, timing,
and extent of audit procedures to be ap
plied and (b) suggestions to be made to the
client.
When EDP is used in significant account
ing applications (that is, those that relate to

accounting information that can materially af
fect the financial statements the auditor is ex
amining), the auditor should consider the EDP
activity in his study and evaluation of internal
accounting control (SAS no. 3, paragraph 3).
The objective of the auditor’s study and
evaluation of internal accounting control (as re
quired by the second standard of field work) is
to establish a basis for reliance thereon in de
termining the nature, extent, and timing of sub
stantive tests. SAS no. 1, section 320.52, pro
vides that, at a minimum, the auditor should
obtain an understanding of the control environ
ment and flow of transactions through the ac
counting system, regardless of the extent to
which the auditor plans to rely on the system of
internal accounting control to restrict substan
tive tests.
On-line processing usually affects only a
portion of an accounting system that may in
clude both manual processing and other types
of EDP processing. When relying on internal
control, the auditor should understand the flow
of transactions and accounting controls
throughout the entire accounting system so
that the on-line processing portion and its re
lated controls are not considered in isolation.
Accordingly, while this guideline addresses the
unique aspects of on-line processing, it is also
concerned with certain other aspects of possi
ble errors and irregularities within the entire
1

EDP portion of an accounting system; it also
deals with the related internal accounting con
trol procedures in the EDP and non-EDP por
tions of that system that are designed to pre
vent or detect such errors and irregularities.
As part of the study and evaluation of in
ternal accounting control, the auditor should
consider the types of material errors or irregu
larities that could occur within the EDP portions
of an accounting system. For example, if the
auditor is concerned about unrecorded trans
actions, he should consider whether transac
tions might be lost during EDP processing. Or,
if the auditor is concerned about unauthorized
transactions, he should consider whether unau
thorized transactions might be introduced
within the EDP portions of the system (for ex

ample, by unauthorized modification of com
puter files through on-line devices).
Control procedures that are designed to
prevent or detect errors and irregularities within
the EDP portion of an accounting system may
help to achieve general control objectives or
application control objectives, and they may be
performed by personnel in either the user de
partment or the EDP department or by com
puter programs. Whether or not control proce
dures are categorized by type of objective and
regardless of where they are applied within a
system, their function is to provide reasonable
assurance that the recording, processing, and
reporting of data are properly performed to
achieve the broad objectives of internal ac
counting control.

Structure of This Guideline
This guideline describesCommon characteristics of on-line environ
ments that distinguish them from other types
of computer processing (chapter 2).
The effect on-line processing has on the
auditor’s identification of potential errors or
irregularities and the control procedures that
are designed to prevent or detect them
(chapter 3).
Possible audit strategies that might be ap
plied in an on-line environment (chapter 4).
Environments that include some common
characteristics of on-line systems but that
have unique characteristics of their own and
the effect such characteristics may have on
the auditor (chapter 5).
The effect on-line systems have on such
auditor concerns as contingency planning,
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which is outside the study and evaluation of
internal accounting control (chapter 6).
• A bibliography that contains sources of more
detailed information to which the auditor may
wish to refer.
The descriptions of possible audit proce
dures in chapter 3 and alternative audit strate
gies presented in the case study in chapter 4
are provided to assist the auditor in planning
and conducting an audit in an environment
where on-line technology is a part of the com
puter system that processes significant ac
counting data. The descriptions do not present
recommended or minimum procedures, nor do
they present a comprehensive summary of all
procedures that might be applied.

CHAPTER 2

Characteristics of On-Line
Systems
Description of On-Line Systems
On-line computer systems have major hard
ware components consisting of input, output,
and storage devices and the central process
ing unit (CPU). In an on-line system the termi
nal is extensively used as an input and output
device. Terminals can include many types of
devices. Cathode ray tubes (CRTs), point-ofsale terminals, intelligent terminals, data collec
tion devices, teller terminals, and printers are
some of the most common.
Although there are many types of on-line
systems, each is characterized by terminals
that directly communicate with the CPU. Data
files and programs are also on-line; that is,
they are stored on a device, usually a disk, that
is directly connected to the CPU. Terminals
may be classified as either remote or local.
Remote terminals require the use of a telecom
munications network to communicate with the
CPU (for example, telephone lines). Local ter
minals are directly attached to the CPU
through the use of cables.
In an on-line system, users may have di
rect access to data and programs from termi
nals located in user departments. Terminals
may be used for inquiries or for data entry. An
inquiry is a request for information made from a
terminal, and it results in information being dis
played on the terminal. Data entry through ter
minals may occur in the user department
where transactions originate. Printers in user
departments may be used to print transactions
during data entry or to print selected reports.
On-line applications can be classified ac
cording to how information is entered into the
system, how it is processed, and when the
results are available to the user. For purposes
of this chapter, on-line application systems are
classified into three groups, depending upon
the type of data entry and the time of file up
dating:
• Single transaction input and immediate mas
ter file update

• Single transaction input and delayed master
file update
• Batch transaction input and delayed master
file update
The major characteristics of these three types
of on-line processing modes follow.

Single Transaction input and immediate
M aster File Update. Individual transactions are
entered at a terminal and immediately edited.
Valid transactions immediately update related
computer files. The results of such processing
are immediately available for inquiries or re
ports. This type of processing is sometimes
referred to as real-time processing. In most
cases the terminal is located in a department
where accounting transactions originate and
data entry is performed by individuals in that
department.

Single Transaction input and Delayed Mas
ter File Update. Individual transactions are en
tered at a terminal, subject to certain editing,
and immediately update a transaction file that
contains transactions processed that day.
Later—for example, on the second processing
shift—the transaction file is further edited and
used to update a master file that includes
transactions or summary data from all prior
processing. New or modified information—the
effect transactions have on master files— is not
available for inquiries or reports until the mas
ter file is updated. In most cases data entry is
performed by individuals who initiated the
transactions.

Batch Transaction Input and Delayed Master
File Update. This type of processing is similar
to batch processing. However, data entry de
vices that create transactions on an auxiliary
storage device are replaced by on-line termi
nals that create records on computer files.
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Transactions are entered from a terminal where
they may or may not be immediately edited.
These transactions are temporarily stored on a
computer file that is later used to update the
master files. Inquiries and reports will not re
flect the transactions until the transactions have
updated the master file. This type of process
ing may be used with terminals located in the
user department or at a central location inde

pendent of the computer department. The data
entry function may be performed by operators
who do not originate the transactions.
There are many types of on-line systems.
The following section describes the character
istics of an on-line system with single transac
tion input and immediate file update. Other
processing modes are discussed in chapter 5.

Characteristics of an Illustrative On-Line System
The system described below is only for illustra
tive purposes to inform the reader of features
that may exist in this type of environment rather
than minimum or suggested features. The reader
should be aware that all on-line systems do not
have all the features discussed in this chapter.
The illustrated system processes transac
tions using on-line data entry with immediate
master file update. This system processes and
accepts data in real time. A real-time system in
an accounting environment receives data,
processes that data, and typically has the re
sults of processing available to the user within
a few seconds. The on-line system illustrated is
typical of one found in a large computer sys
tem where there is a separate computer de
partment. If the on-line system involves a mini
computer, the auditor may refer to the AICPA
guideline entitled Audit and Control Considera
tions in a l\/linicomputer or Small Business
Computer Environment for additional guidance.
Each of the characteristics described be
low should be considered in the study and
evaluation of internal accounting control in an
on-line environment. Many audit and control
considerations do not change in this environ
ment. However, some of the unique character
istics do have an impact on the auditor’s re
view of controls. Chapter 3 discusses the effect
on-line processing has on the auditor’s study
and evaluation of internal accounting control.

Input of Data. As illustrated in figure 1, a sin
gle transaction is entered into the system from
a terminal located in the user department. As
the transaction is entered, the terminal displays
data for visual verification by the terminal oper
ator. For example, when the customer number
is entered, the customer name is displayed on
the screen. Erroneous transactions are rejected
and then corrected at the time of data entry.
User personnel function as data entry opera
tors, a role that few of them have experienced
in the past. Descriptions of required data fields
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and operator-prompting messages are dis
played to assist users in performing their func
tions.
The transaction is read into memory,
where it is validated and errors are identified
for correction. For example, the system verifies
that only numeric information was entered into
numeric fields. The amount of on-line editing to
be performed is determined when the system
is designed. Transactions that fail edit tests are
usually rejected immediately; in many cases,
rejected transactions can be immediately cor
rected and re-entered.
An on-line system may provide an on-line
batch-balancing facility. In such a system, con
trol totals would be entered into the system
before transactions are entered. For example,
the total quantity for all customer orders would
be entered; the user would then enter transac
tions in the batch. At the end of the batch, any
discrepancies between the manually calculated
totals and the computer-generated totals would
be printed on a report or displayed on the
terminal. The batch of transactions would not
be accepted until the control totals balanced
with the transactions entered. (For example,
the total quantity ordered must equal the total
quantity keyed in from each order in the
batch.) This approach is similar to batching
and batch balancing in systems that do not
involve on-line processing.
An alternative method used to control data
entry is the entry of a manually calculated total
within an individual transaction. For example, in
an on-line order entry application, entry of all
line items on the order may require several
screens of transactions, each containing ten to
twenty line items. Using the order, the user
would enter the manually calculated total of all
line item order quantities for each order. The
computer would not accept the order unless
the computer-calculated total matched the
manually calculated total. Hash totals such as
these can be used for a variety of fields.

Processing of Data. A valid transaction up
dates master file information immediately. The
results of processing are immediately available
for inquiry or reports. Before any critical file is
updated, the transaction is written to a journal
file, which is used for backup purposes. The
journal can be maintained on tape or disk. In
this type of processing, having backup plans
for the restoration of operations after a hard
ware or system failure is particularly important.
Journal files may not be available in some on
line environments. However, alternate proce
dures may be implemented to provide ade
quate backup of files. A further discussion of
backup considerations is included in
chapter 6.
The nature of on-line processing requires
that all programs and data files needed for on
line operations be directly accessible to users
through terminals. Terminals provide many
points of direct access to the system that are
outside the physical control of the data pro
cessing department. As a result, security
measures are implemented to control access to
and use of data processing resources. In the
illustrated system, terminals are restricted to
specific transactions through the use of physi
cal access devices and system software. Phys
ical access devices include a combination of
keylocks and badge readers. The keys and
badges are kept in a secure location when not
in use.
As a further security measure, the system
has the ability to recognize users and will allow
them access to only those resources for which
they have authorization. Users are limited to
those functions required to carry out their re
sponsibilities. In the illustrated system, each
user has been assigned a password and user
identification code. Since different passwords
allow different degrees of access to the sys
tem, when a user enters a valid password and
user identification code at the terminal, he can
execute programs or read data but cannot
change programs. The ability to modify or up
date information in data files is similarly re
stricted to certain individuals.
All users are held accountable for their
individual activities. When a user signs on the
system with a valid password, all activities per
formed are logged into a history file with the
user identification, terminal identification, time,
and date. This file is available to management
for subsequent review. In addition, all at
tempted security violations are logged by the
system and reported to management.
Passwords are encrypted in the system.
Encryption is a process by which data is con
verted into an algorithmic representation. The

encrypted data is uninterpretable unless it is
read by use of the algorithm, access to which
is restricted to authorized personnel.
Procedures have been implemented to
maintain and change passwords on a periodic
basis as the business environment changes
(for example, through personnel turnover).
When a job is complete, the system automa
tically signs the user off. To gain access again,
a valid password and user identification code
must be re-entered. All accesses to sensitive
data (for example, changes in the employee
master file) are logged and available for subse
quent management review.
Some terminals are restricted to certain
functions. For example, terminals located in the
warehouse are restricted to processing inven
tory transactions.
Terminals are also available to program
mers for developing and modifying computer
programs. The system software restricts ac
cess to programming capabilities by providing
some aspects of a librarian function. Librarian
systems are designed to control access to pro
grams and data files by requiring passwords,
as just described. Programmers are not al
lowed access to data files. Additional guidance
is available to the auditor in the AICPA guide
line entitled Controls Over Using and Changing
Computer Programs.

Distribution of Output. In the illustrated sys
tem, processing results (output) are communi
cated to the user through inquiry or report pro
grams. An inquiry is a request that information
stored in the system be displayed on the termi
nal. The user cannot change or manipulate
data during an inquiry. Report programs pro
vide information to the user in printed form.
Many of the reports printed in the user depart
ment are those requested on demand by the
user, or they are printed records of transac
tions entered during data entry procedures.
These printers do not replace the system
printer, which is still located in the computer
room. Therefore, most reports (for example,
monthly or weekly reports) are still generated in
the computer room and distributed to the
users.
The system has been designed to provide
processing prompts and responses to super
vise the loading of proper forms and the print
ing of sensitive reports on remote printers.
Passwords have been assigned to restrict the
processing of reports and inquiries to specific
users. Sequentially assigned control numbers
are printed on each report to allow manage
ment to verify that all requested reports are
printed.
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Comparison of On-Line Systems to
Batch Systems
A comparison of the on-line system described
in this chapter to a batch system is illustrated
in figure 2 to give the reader a better under
standing of the characteristics previously dis
cussed. In the on-line processing system illus
trated, transactions are processed when they
are entered through terminals in the user de
partment. In the batch system illustrated, data
is processed in groups, from start to finish.
Transactions are still prepared by the user;
however, they are accumulated in batches and
entered by a data entry operator function within
the data processing department, processed by
data processing, and controlled by a separate
control department. Input devices (for example,
terminals) are located in the user area in the
on-line environment but are centrally located in
the EDP department for batch system process
ing.
Since both on-line and batch systems
process similar applications, there are many
similarities in the functions provided by the ap
plication programs. The timing of certain pro
cessing may, however, change. For example, in
an on-line system, editing of data and correc
tion of errors are usually part of data entry; in a
batch system, editing is usually performed after
all data is captured, and users typically receive
hard-copy reports of errors that must be cor
rected and resubmitted for processing. Appli
cation programs in an on-line environment also
contain prompting messages to make the entry
of data easier.
Backup and recovery considerations in an
on-line system differ from those in a batch en
vironment. In a batch system, the transaction
files may be copied and stored off-line before

updating the master file. If something goes
wrong during the update process, files main
tained off-line can be restored to the system
and the update process can be started again.
In an on-line system, transactions may up
date the master files immediately. As in a
batch system, periodic copies of on-line master
files are typically made and maintained off-line.
However, if something goes wrong during the
update process, the system could lose all
transactions that updated the master files since
the last backup was made. Recovery could
require the re-entry of all such transactions
once the old master files are restored to the
system. To eliminate the need to re-enter trans
actions, transaction journal files or log files are
effective tools that record all updates to master
files since the last backup of the files was
made.
Additional software is used in an on-line
system that is not required for batch process
ing. On-line software allocates the use of com
puter resources among multiple users. Pro
cessing at terminals and the controls over the
communication of information between termi
nals and the processing unit are controlled by
software, commonly known as system software.
In a batch environment, printing is typically
done in the computer room and then delivered
to the users. In an on-line environment, user
departments schedule the entry of data, control
all source documents, and select the appropri
ate procedures to complete the processing of
data. Thus, the output results may also be
available at terminals or printers located in the
user area.

Summary
Some characteristics of an on-line environment
may introduce additional audit and control con
siderations. The user department may control
the entire processing of transactions— initiation
and authorization of source documents, input,
processing, distribution, and use of resulting
output reports. Personnel in the user depart
ments may have direct access to the com
puter, thus bypassing the control functions of
computer room access security, the input/out
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put control group, and the computer operations
group.
Control procedures encountered in batchprocessing systems may have changed, and
as a result the auditor may encounter new con
trol procedures in the on-line environment. This
chapter identified and described some of the
characteristics that may exist in an on-line sys
tem. The use of an on-line system may change
the degree of risk of certain errors and irregu

larities occurring. Chapter 3 discusses the risk
of errors and irregularities occurring in financial
applications using on-line technology, and it

reviews controls that may reduce the exposure
to these risks.

FIGURE 1
ON-LINE SYSTEM, SINGLE TRANSACTION
IMMEDIATE UPDATE
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FIGURE 2

ON-LINE VS. BATCH

CHAPTER 3

Auditing in an On-Line
Environment
Audit Considerations in an On-Line Environment
The use of on-line technology does not change
the types of errors and irregularities that could
occur in processing significant accounting ap
plications. For this reason the control proce
dures encountered in on-line systems are, in
many respects, similar to those found in other
processing systems. However, there are
unique characteristics in an on-line processing
environment that may affect the auditor’s con
siderations in designing and performing audit
procedures. These considerations, described
in the following sections, include—
• Changes in the likelihood of occurrence of
certain types of errors or irregularities.
• Changes in the nature and extent of con
trols.
• Changes in the nature of the audit trail and
the sources of audit evidence.

Changes in the Likelihood of Occurrence
of Certain Types of Errors and Irregu
larities. Certain types of errors and irregulari
ties are less likely to occur in an on-line pro
cessing system than in a computer system that
doesn’t use on-line technology, while other
types of errors and irregularities are more likely
to occur.
In on-line environments, the following cir
cumstances reduce the risk of the types of
errors and irregularities specified:
• If on-line entry is performed at or near the
point where transactions originate, there is
less risk that transaction documents will be
lost prior to data conversion.
• Transactions rejected by the system due to
edit errors may be corrected and re-entered
immediately: thus, there is less risk that such
transactions will not be corrected and resub
mitted.
• If data entry is performed on-line by individu
als who understand the nature of the trans
actions involved, the conversion process

may be less prone to errors than when con
version is performed by other individuals
(for example, by keypunch operators in the
data processing department).
• If on-line transactions are processed imme
diately, there is less risk that they will be
processed in the wrong accounting period.
In on-line environments, the following cir
cumstances increase the risk of the types of
errors and irregularities specified:
• If on-line terminals are located throughout
the organization, the opportunity for the entry
of unauthorized transactions may increase.
• Uncontrolled remote terminals may provide
the opportunity for the unauthorized modifi
cation of transactions or balances already on
computer files.
• Uncontrolled remote terminals may provide
the opportunity for unauthorized modifica
tions of computer programs.
• Unauthorized terminals (for example, through
dial-up capabilities) may provide the oppor
tunity for unauthorized access to data and
programs.
• When on-line processing is initially imple
mented, the opportunity for accidental input
and processing errors may be greater than
for other types of systems because—
■ EDP department personnel may lack ex
perience in on-line technology and on-line
processing.
■ EDP and user departments may not yet be
familiar with new types of control proce
dures unique to on-line processing.
■ On-line entry of data may be performed by
inexperienced personnel.
• If on-line service is interrupted (for example,
by a power failure), there may be a greater
chance that transactions or files may be lost
and that the recovery may not be accurate
and complete.
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In an on-line system there are additional
sources of errors; for example, there may be
hardware failures in on-line terminals or errors
may be caused by improper routines within the
system software used for on-line data entry.
Changes in the Nature and Extent of Con
trols. On-line controls may be similar or sub
stantially different from those typically used for
other types of EDP. For example, if an on-line
system replaces a batch EDP system, certain
control procedures may remain the same, dif
ferent control procedures may be used to
achieve the same control objectives, or control
procedures related to certain objectives may
not be used. If a type of control is not used,
the absence may be justified because related
risks (for example, the risk that transaction
documents will be lost in transmittal) have
been reduced. However, it is possible that sig
nificant risks still exist and that related controls
should have been included in the design of the
new on-line system but were not.
Balancing is a type of control procedure
that may not change when on-line processing
is used even though traditional batch control
procedures may not be used. For example, in
a batch system that processes sales transac
tions, the completeness of processing may be
controlled by comparing a manually prepared
total of all daily sales to an EDP report total of
all daily sales. If the system is modified so that
sales transactions are entered on-line, the
batch-balancing procedures may still be used
to control the completeness of data entry and
processing.
Data conversion verification is a type of
control procedure that frequently changes in
nature when on-line processing is used. In a
batch EDP application, for example, the accu
racy of data conversion may be controlled by a
second keying operation performed by a sec
ond person. When on-line data entry is used,
rekeying by a second person is not practical,
but other types of controls may be used to
achieve the same control objective. For exam
ple, data entry errors may be detected by
batch totals, duplicate on-line entry of critical
values by the same person, programmed rea
sonableness tests, or visual verification of val
ues displayed on the on-line terminal.
On-line systems are frequently character
ized by redundant control procedures related
to the same control objective. For example, the
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accuracy and completeness of the electronic
transmission of data from a terminal to a com
puter may be controlled by mechanisms within
computer hardware and system software and
by balancing controls performed by the users
of the data. Since data may be used as soon
as it is entered into the system (for example,
by remote inquiry), there is a greater emphasis
on controls that will prevent errors. However,
since some errors are usually unavoidable,
most systems also include controls that will de
tect errors. In such cases certain controls may
appear to be redundant, since multiple controls
achieve the same control objective. However,
client operational requirements may require
both preventive and detective controls.
Changes in the Nature of the Audit Trail and
the Sources of Audit Evidence. To under
stand the flow of transactions in a batch EDP
system, the auditor may trace the path of a
transaction from the point of initiation to the
result—financial statements— by reference to a
series of reports. When on-line processing is
used, the nature of this audit trail may be sub
stantially altered. In addition, there may be
changes in the sources of audit evidence that
may be used in compliance tests or substan
tive tests. On-line processing may have the
following effects:
• The audit trail may be highly summarized
(for example, only totals from individual on
line terminals can be traced to subsequent
processing), or, in the extreme, the audit trail
may be incomplete (for example, individual
transactions cannot be traced forward to re
ports that result from subsequent process
ing).
• There may not be source documents for ev
ery input transaction.
• Input documents may be filed at many dis
persed locations, and therefore retrieval of
documents for audit examination may be dif
ficult.
• Printed reports indicating that controls are
effective may not be produced (for example,
edit reports may be replaced by interactive
edit warnings displayed on a data entry ter
minal screen).
• There may be increased use of hardware
controls or controls within computer pro
grams that may be more difficult to test.

Changes in the Audit Approach
As just outlined, on-line processing, by its very
nature, may occasion changes in the likelihood
of error, changes in controls, and changes in
the audit trail that may affect an audit ap
proach to a greater or lesser extent, depending
upon—
• The nature and magnitude of the errors and
irregularities that might occur.
• The apparent reliability of internal accounting
controls throughout the entire system.
• The extent to which reliance on internal ac
counting controls within the EDP portion of
the system is necessary or desirable to the
planned audit approach.
• The time and skill required to evaluate con
trols.
• The extent to which substantive tests are
effective in detecting the types of errors and
irregularities that might occur within the EDP
portion of the system.
The effect of on-line processing can be
illustrated by a situation in which batch pro
cessing is replaced by on-line processing. If the
audit approach relies upon a combination of
user department controls and substantive tests,
the introduction of on-line processing may re
quire only minimal changes. User department
controls would, of course, have to be re-evalu
ated to determine that they were effective in
detecting or preventing errors and irregularities
that could occur within the on-line portion of
the system. However, the introduction of on-line
processing may significantly affect the audit
approach if the audit relied primarily upon con
trols within the EDP portions of a system (for
example, batch balancing, keystroke verifica
tion, and run-to-run balancing). In this situation
the introduction of on-line processing will prob
ably require a change in specific audit proce
dures and perhaps a change in the previous
audit approach, including (1) the evaluation of
new controls, (2) the evaluation of control
weaknesses to determine their effect on sub
stantive tests, (3) the design and performance
of compliance tests for new controls, and, pos
sibly, (4) the modification of previously used
substantive tests.
At a more detailed level, changes in the

audit approach that might result from the use
of on-line processing include—
Compliance tests that include the entry of
test transactions by using on-line terminals
(for example, to test the password access
controls or to test the adequacy of pro
grammed edits and reasonableness tests).
To the extent that on-line control procedures
are not evidenced by reports or control
documents, a shift from compliance tests
that involve the review of documents to com
pliance tests that consist of observations of
control activity performed by terminal opera
tors.
Greater use of tests of processing results
rather than tests of controls, because such
tests of processing results are more costeffective (for example, audit software is used
to analyze files for the presence of values
that should have been prevented by con
trols).
The participation on the audit team of indi
viduals with technical proficiency in on-line
processing and related controls (for exam
ple, to assist the audit team in developing
their understanding of the flow of transac
tions through complex on-line systems, to
assess the apparent adequacy of controls
embedded in hardware or system software,
to evaluate related risks, and, if reliance on
controls is planned, to test and to assist in
the evaluation of technically oriented con
trols).
More extensive analysis of the likelihood and
nature of possible errors and irregularities to
determine if the absence of controls previ
ously used by the client is justified by re
duced levels of risk. If the audit plan used in
prior years included reliance on discontin
ued controls, revisions to the audit plan—
either to include reliance on new controls or
to include substantive procedures related to
uncontrolled risks— should be made.
Changes in the nature and timing of audit
procedures necessary to observe controls,
to perform procedures using audit software,
to perform procedures at remote locations,
or to use staff with special technical profi
ciency.
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Controls in an On-Line Environment
As previously stated, the evaluation of internal
accounting controls within the on-line portion of
a system is part of the overall evaluation of
internal accounting control. Such an evaluation
should include EDP general controls and EDP
application controls in both the user and EDP
departments.

to determine whether general control objectives
that affect the application control procedures
were achieved. Alternatively, the auditor may
identify application control procedures (that is,
manual controls) that are not based on the
effectiveness of the general controls in which
weaknesses were found.

EDP General Controls. EDP general controls
are those controls that apply to more than one
EDP application or to all the processing per
formed by a data center. A common set of
programs might be used to process input
transactions for all on-line applications. Such
common programs may include controls that
apply to all processing, or they may permit
controls to be customized for each application.
For example, within a common on-line input
program, specific passwords and levels of se
curity may be tailored to the unique security
requirements of each type of input transaction.
Accordingly, the distinction between general
controls and application controls may be re
duced, and the auditor may have to determine
how the specific aspects of general controls
apply to each significant EDP application.
Most EDP general controls applicable to
other types of processing are also applicable
to on-line processing. However, certain EDP
general controls are specifically related to on
line processing. These include—

Application Controls. While specific relation
ships must be determined for every applica
tion, there are general relationships between
certain control procedures and control objec
tives. These relationships are illustrated in
table 1.
When selecting control procedures that
might be relied upon, the auditor should con
sider the control objectives that the control pro
cedures may achieve, the specific type of error
controlled, the apparent reliability of the con
trol, and whether there are duplicate control
procedures.
Control procedures may have a broad or
narrow effect and may prevent or detect one or
more types of errors. For example, the dupli
cate keying of a critical input value will only
detect data conversion errors, while the bal
ancing of input totals to report totals may de
tect certain types of conversion errors as well
as many types of subsequent processing er
rors.
Frequently, several control procedures
may be used to prevent or detect the same
type of error, and, accordingly, table 1 in
cludes more than one type of control proce
dure for most control objectives. For example,
table 1 indicates that the accuracy of on-line
data conversion may be controlled by one or
more of the following procedures; batching,
conversion verification, edits and reasonable
ness tests, system matching, balancing, and
postprocessing review. The use of more than
one control is often justified in the absence of
preventive controls, since errors might not
otherwise be detected until the end of process
ing, and reprocessing delays would then oc
cur. When more than one control procedure is
identified as achieving a control objective, only
those control procedures the auditor plans to
rely upon would be subjected to detailed re
view, evaluation, and testing.
In addition to the EDP-related control pro
cedures listed in table 1, more traditional con
trols, such as the use of prenumbered docu
ments or the comparison of processing results
to budgets, may also be used to prevent or
detect errors in the on-line and other EDP por
tions of a system. Technically oriented EDP

• Controls over access to user and data cen
ter on-line terminals, which prevent—
■ Entry of unauthorized transactions.
■ Unauthorized changes to computer files.
■ Unauthorized changes to computer pro
grams.
■ Unauthorized use of computer programs.
• Controls over the assignment and confiden
tiality of passwords.
• Procedures used to design new on-line EDP
applications that provide for the inclusion of
effective on-line controls.
If certain EDP general control procedures
are absent or not operational, the auditor
should consider whether such a condition im
pairs the effectiveness of application controls
used for significant accounting applications.
However, a situation in which one or more gen
eral control objectives is not achieved does not
preclude reliance on application controls if
tests of application controls indicate that such
controls are, in fact, effective. In order for the
auditor to determine the effectiveness of appli
cation controls, separate tests may be required
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controls (for example, the use of special con
trol characters and parity bits to control data
transmission) are not included in table 1. While
such preventive controls contribute to the ac
curacy and completeness of processing in

general, there are other detective controls that
are easier for auditors to evaluate and test.
(The bibliography includes publications that
cover technically oriented controls.)

Testing Controls
If the auditor decides to rely on EDP controls,
he should design compliance tests to determine
whether a control is functioning effectively and
achieving its objectives. The auditor should
compliance test only those controls on which
he plans to rely. If two or more controls
achieve the same control objective, it is neces
sary to test only one control. Assuming that
both controls are equally effective, the control
that should be tested is usually the one that is
most cost-effective to test.

To assist the auditor in the identification of
control procedures common to systems that
involve on-line processing, table 1 lists control
objectives and control procedures; table 2 de
scribes each control procedure and provides
examples of tests of that control. The controls
and the examples included in these tables are
not all inclusive but rather represent types of
controls an auditor might encounter in on-line
environments.
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1. Input data
properly
authorized

2. Accurate
conversion
of input

3. Input
properly
identified

4. Input not lost,
duplicated, or
improperly
changed

Input

16. Postprocessing review

15. Output distribution controls

14. Access controls

13. System development and
maintenance controls______________________________________________________________

12. Master file controls____________________________________________________________

5. Input not
suppressed,
added, or
improperly
changed

Control Objectives

11. Balancing________________________________________________________________

10. File controls___________________________________________________________

9. Cutoff procedures___________________________________________________

8. Error correction and resubmission

7. System matching_____________________________________________

6. Edits and reasonableness tests

5. Conversion verification

4. Batching_________________________________________

3. Terminal security controls

2. Preprocessing review

1. Preprocessing authorization

Control Procedures

TABLE 1

6. Incorrect
input
rejected

7. Rejected
input
corrected
and
resub
mitted
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8. Processed as
authorized

16. Postprocessing review

15. Output distribution controls

14. Access controls

13. System development and
maintenance controls

12. Master file controls

11. Balancing

10. File controls

9. Cutoff procedures

8. Error correction and resubmission

7. System matching_________________________________

6. Edits and reasonableness tests

5. Conversion verification______________________

4. Batching

3. Terminal security controls

2. Preprocessing review

1. Preprocessing authorization

Control Procedures

TABLE 1 (continued)

9. Authorized
transactions not
omitted

Processing

10, Unauthorized
transactions not
added

Control Objectives

11. Output
processing
results accurate

12. Output to
authorized
personnel
only

Output
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Observe location and use of terminals.
Attempt to input unauthorized transaction types
for certain terminals and/or operators.
Review procedures for maintaining and changing
control tables and passwords.
Review and observe the batching procedures.
Verify the batching procedures for selected input
data groups.

Terminal access is restricted.
Control tables (i.e., passwords) restrict terminals’
and/or operators’ entering certain transaction
types.
Establish control totals (e.g., transaction count,
aggregate sales transaction amount) and submit
input data that represent sales transactions in
groups. Computer accumulates similar control to
tals for each input data group during initial pro
cessing. Then established control totals and con
trol totals accumulated by the computer are bal
anced.
Redundant entry of data into a terminal to verify
the accuracy of a prior entry.
Visual verification of the reasonableness of input
data.

3. Terminal security controls— Con
trols for preventing unauthorized
submission or processing of input
data through terminals.

4. Batching—The process of estab
lishing control totals and submitting
input data in groups to provide as
surance that proper input data is
processed by the computer.

5. Conversion verification— Control
procedures for providing assur
ance that input data is properly
converted into machine-readable
form.

Attempt to enter input data without entering the
required redundant data and/or inaccurately enter
some of the redundant data, and determine if the
computer properly responds to these situations.

Examine input documents for evidence of review,
or observe the review process.

User department or data center control personnel
review input documents for propriety (e.g., deter
mine that input represents valid, authorized trans
actions).

2. Preprocessing review— Review of
input documents before submitted.

Example of Test tor Procedure
Examine transactions for evidence of authoriza
tion, or observe the authorization process.
Attempt to input unauthorized transaction types
for certain terminals and/or operators.
Review procedures for maintaining and changing
control tables and passwords.

Example Procedure
Designated personnel approve all transactions
before processing.
Control tables (i.e., passwords) restrict terminals’
and/or operators’ entering certain transaction
types.

Table of Control Procedures

Control Procedure
1. Preprocessing authorization—
Advance permission to initiate a
transaction.

TABLE 2
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Example Procedure
Validity tests (e.g., determining that a data ele
ment is an acceptable value based on information
maintained in a computer file or table).
Dependency tests (e.g., determining that there is
a logical relationship between two or more data
elements in an input data record).
Order entry, sales, and receivable system that
prevents the processing of sales transactions if
the customer’s credit limit has been exceeded.
Payroll system that provides a report that lists all
payroll checks over $1,000.
Sequence checks— Program that checks for miss
ing numbered documents.
Vendor payments are not processed unless there
is a corresponding open purchase order.
Payroll data is not processed unless there is a
corresponding employee master record.

Printed list of transactions with errors is prepared
by computer and delivered to personnel responsi
ble for correction and resubmission.
Computer maintains a file of transactions with er
rors and prepares a printed list of transactions not
resubmitted that is delivered to personnel respon
sible for correction and resubmission.
Schedules and procedures that permit manually
monitoring and coordinating the receipt of input
data and performing the related processing.
Programmed routines that determine, based on
the relationship between the transaction date and
the processing period, whether the transaction
should be processed.

7. System matching— Programmed
routines that prevent processing of
input data unless the information
matches with related data that was
previously entered and is ac
cessed by the computer.

8. Error correction and resubmis
sion— Procedures to ensure that
transactions rejected due to errors
are corrected and resubmitted on
a timely basis.

9. Cutoff procedures— Procedures
that ensure transactions are pro
cessed in the proper period.

Table of Control Procedures

Control Procedure
6. Edits and reasonableness
tests—Programmed routines that
check the input data and process
ing results for completeness, accu
racy, and reasonableness.

TABLE 2 (continued)

See 6 above.

Identify transactions with errors and determine
that the transactions were corrected and resub
mitted.
Investigate old uncorrected errors.
Review and observe computer scheduling and
processing procedures.

Review and observe error correction and resub
mission procedures.

See 5 above.

See 5 above.

Use test data to check the edit routines.

Example of Test for Procedure
Use computer audit software to perform an afterthe-fact edit of the input data.
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Example of Test for Procedure
Review and observe computer scheduling, file li
brary, and processing procedures.

Review and observe the balancing procedures.
Examine control total forms and reports for evi
dence that the balancing procedures were per
formed.
Verify the control total information for selected
processing phases.

See information for other types of controls dis
cussed in this table.
Review and observe the procedures for reviewing
master file data.
Examine master file data lists for evidence that
the data were reviewed and/or review the data.

Example Procedure
Programmed routines to determine that the proper
data files are being used (e.g., by checking the
data file’s labels or header records, generation
data set information).
Processing schedules and file library procedures
that permit the processing of data files on a con
tinuous basis.
Manually developed control total for all input data,
less error transactions, is compared to a com
puter-produced control total for all input data ac
cepted by the initial processing phase.
Programmed routines that retain a control total for
all previously processed input data add this total
to the total for new input data, and they compare
the sum of these two totals to the total for the
updated file. A computer report that includes all
control totals and indicates if the system is in or
out of balance is printed.
Appropriate use of the other types of controls
discussed in this table.
Periodically print and review the master file data.
Periodically print all changes to the master file,
including the information before it was changed.

Computer program change procedures that pro
Review and observe the program change proce
vide for properly planning, programming, testing,
dures.
documenting, reviewing, approving, and imple
Trace selected program changes to the appropri
menting all authorized program changes and pre ate supporting records.
venting unauthorized changes from being imple
mented.
Restricted access to production program libraries Review for adequacy the methods used to restrict
and utility programs.
access.

11. Balancing—The process of estab
lishing control totals over the data
being processed and comparing
the control totals during or after
processing to ensure that the
proper data is transferred to each
processing phase.

12. Master file controls— Changes to
master files are controlled by pro
cedures similar to those used for
controlling other input transaction
data. However, since master file
data can have a pervasive effect
on processing, more stringent en
forcement of the control proce
dures may be necessary.

13. System development and main
tenance controls— Procedures
that ensure there are limited op
portunities for improper processing
due to unauthorized or improper
changes to computer programs.

Table of Control Procedures

Control Procedure
10. File controls— Procedures to en
sure that the proper data files are
used for processing.

TABLE 2 (continued)
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Example Procedure
Terminals are used to prevent unauthorized ac
cess to data and programs.

Output is delivered on a timely basis to properly
authorized users.

Payroll totals by department are reviewed and
compared to payroll expense budgets.
Salesmen gross margins are reviewed for reason
ableness.

15. Output distribution controls—
Procedures that ensure output is
distributed to only authorized per
sonnel.

16. Postprocessing review— Review
of computer-produced reports for
reasonableness and completeness.

Table of Control Procedures

Control Procedure
14. Access controls— Procedures that
provide safeguards to insure that
EDP resources are properly uti
lized.

TABLE 2 (continued)

Examine reviewed reports and determine if there
is evidence that the postprocessing review was
performed.
Examine evidence that indicates effective followup procedures were used when possible errors
were detected, and determine if all possible er
rors were detected.

Observe the effectiveness of the procedures.

Example of Test for Procedure
Review for adequacy the methods used to restrict
access.

CHAPTER 4

Audit Implications of On-Line
Systems: A Case Study
Introduction
This chapter illustrates how the auditor’s evalu
ation of an on-line computer system might af
fect subsequent work over a period of three
years. Emphasis has been placed on planning
the audit work, based on findings during the
preliminary phase of the auditor’s review of in

ternal accounting control. Client implementation
of the auditor’s management letter recommen
dations made during the first-year audit is a
consideration during the second- and thirdyear audits.

Overview
The auditor was engaged by an auto parts
distributor to audit its financial statements for
the fiscal years ended December 31, 19X1,
19X2, and 19X3. The company’s annual sales
were approximately $50 million.
During all three years the client was func
tionally organized as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Operations
Finance
Data Processing (EDP)
Marketing

Each of the vice-presidents in charge of these
functions reported directly to an executive
vice-president who, in turn, reported to the
president.
The company has an in-house, on-line
computer system with terminals located in the
company’s main office and in three ware
houses. Inventory is the only significant ac
counting application that uses on-line computer
processing. Financial applications that do not
use on-line processing are not included in this
case study.

Background
The size of the EDP department has remained
relatively constant at six to eight persons dur
ing the past three years; it consists of a man
ager, an applications programming group, an
operations group, and a data control clerk. The
programming group has designed and main
tained the inventory application.
During the entire three-year period, the
central processing unit (CPU) was located in

the main office. Local terminals were located in
the applications programming area and in the
main office; each of the warehouses had two
remote cathode ray tube (CRT) terminals.
Passwords were used for terminal user iden
tification. The on-line system was available from
8 A.M . to 8 P.M. Monday through Friday and
from 8 A.M . to 12 noon on Saturday.

System Description
As summarized in this section, the auditor
gained an understanding of the processing en
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vironment and the flow of transactions through
the on-line system. The description that follows

relates to all three audit years being consid
ered.
Initial inventory part-number setup and
subsequent file maintenance transactions are
reviewed and approved by appropriate super
visors and thereafter entered by authorized
clerical and warehouse personnel. There are
approximately ten thousand active part num
bers; the processing mode is single transaction
input with immediate file update, similar to that
described in chapter 2.
On-line edits are provided and include the
following;
• Inventory part-number check-digit calcula
tion to identify erroneous input
• Tests for invalid information items, such as
blank file maintenance fields or a missing
vendor supply code
Daily transaction totals are accumulated
on-line, and summary totals are printed at the
terminal for balancing purposes. Balancing
sheets are totaled for each warehouse and

then sent to the shipping department in the
main office.
Reports indicating the accumulated sum
mary totals of data entered for each warehouse
are distributed by the EDP control clerk to the
shipping department balancing clerk at 8 a . m .
on the next business day. Friday and Saturday
totals are segregated on the Monday report for
shipping department review. Differences are in
vestigated by supervisors, and corrections, if
any, are made as needed.
Monthly printouts of detailed inventory ac
count balances are distributed by the EDP
control clerk. The accounting department com
pares the extended dollar totals from these lists
to general ledger control balances provided by
a batch application. In addition, a review is
made to ensure that transactions have been
processed in the proper period and that appro
priate data files were used for processing. Cor
rections necessitated by such comparison and
review are entered promptly under accounting
department supervision.

Case Study
The following sections set forth audit planning
considerations, preliminary evaluation of con
trols, and audit effects of the evaluation of
controls for each audit year.
19X1. During the preliminary phase of the inter
nal control review, the auditor documented an
understanding of the flow of significant ac
counting transactions and the general and ap
plication accounting controls within significant
accounting applications, including the inven
tory system.
The preliminary assessment of EDP con
trols indicated that the auditor was unable to
place reliance on them. The primary reason for
this assessment was the lack of client control
over access to the master file via the terminals.
The specific audit effect on the inventory was
the possibility for terminal users to make unau
thorized changes in the inventory master file.
For example, an invalid stock transfer transac
tion could be entered to prevent the detection
of unauthorized shipments of parts. Another
reason for the preliminary assessment was the
lack of control over program changes: there
was a concern that this might affect the com
putation of inventory balances.

Based upon the preliminary assessment of
an Inability to place reliance on EDP controls,
the auditor discontinued his EDP accounting
control review and did not perform compliance
tests. An audit approach consisting of substan
tive tests that included observing the client’s
physical inventory count at year end was de
signed. Generalized audit software was used
to perform tests of data in the inventory master
file. The objective of these tests was to deter
mine the reasonableness of recorded inven
tory activity during the year. For example, soft
ware procedures included comparing items
shipped to items billed and recomputing ex
tended inventory dollars and comparing them
with the client computation. No exceptions
were noted.
The finding of lack of control over master
file changes was presented to the company in
the management letter, which included a recom
mendation for the client to establish file secu
rity codes in order to restrict data file access
on a strict need basis.* The recommendation
included the institution of a daily report proce
dure to inform management about unauthor
ized attempts to access restricted files. In ad
dition, a recommendation related to program

*The auditor did not consider this lack of control to be a material weakness as defined in SAS no. 20, Required
Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control, because there was a mitigating control procedure of
taking periodic physical inventory counts and reconciling them with the perpetual records maintained on the computer
master file. No reliance was placed on the mitigating control procedure in determining the substantive testing.

21

change control was made in order to restrict
application programmers’ access to production
libraries and utility programs. It was also rec
ommended that programmers not be permitted
to place new versions of programs in the pro
duction library and that the operations group
be responsible for implementing changes, as
described in the AICPA Computer Services
Guideline entitled Controls Over Using and
Changing Computer Programs.
19X2. The auditor updated the prior year’s in
ternal control review and noted that, during the
fourth quarter, the client had implemented the
recommendations listed in the 19X1 manage
ment letter. Special emphasis was made to
note that file security codes and program
change control procedures existed.
The preliminary assessment of EDP con
trols indicated that in the fourth quarter there
appeared to be a basis for reliance on them.

19X3. The auditor updated the prior year’s in
ternal control review and identified general and
application controls that might be relied upon.
Compliance tests of the procedures the auditor
had identified were performed.
A summary of the compliance testing of
EDP general controls is as follows:

Testing Method

General Control Area
Organization and operation

Observation and inquiry
Examination of related client documentation

Systems development and
documentation

Observation and inquiry of system maintenance
Examination of related client documentation

Access

Test of defined control procedures

Data and procedural

Observation and inquiry

Hardware and system software

Observation and inquiry

The auditor determined, based on his
compliance tests, that general controls were
working as prescribed (thereby correcting the
deficiency that existed in prior years), and they
provided a basis for reliance. The auditor
agreed that the client could take the physical
inventory at an intermediate date rather than at
year end.
The substantive testing of inventory rec
ords by using generalized audit software was
implemented as part of the internal audit pro
gram. In addition, the internal audit program
included tests of the new program change
control procedures. The external auditor re
viewed qualifications of the personnel in the
internal audit department and the internal audit
program and its procedures in accordance
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There still remained, however, a concern for
the lack of control during the first three quar
ters of the fiscal year. Thus, substantive audit
procedures employed for the 19X1 engage
ment were again performed for 19X2. No ex
ceptions were noted.
The 19X2 management letter included a
recommendation for the client to develop an
EDP audit capability within the internal audit
function. The external auditor planned to assist
in developing such audit capability by training
the internal auditor in the use of audit software.

with SAS no. 9, The Effect of an Internal Audit
Function on the Scope of the Independent
Auditor’s Examination. During the performance
of interim audit procedures, the auditor re
viewed the client’s system of internal account
ing control in accordance with SAS no. 1, sec
tion 320.65.
The external auditor’s approach over the
three-year period resulted in—
• A more cost-effective and timely audit.
• Improved client internal controls.
• A more effective internal audit function, in
cluding computer audit capabilities.
This approach provided the auditor with an ef
fective way to meet professional standards dur
ing the three-year period.

CHAPTER 5

Audit Considerations in Other
Environments
Introduction
Chapter 2 described an on-line system with
single transaction input and immediate master
file update. On-line systems that process trans
actions by using single transaction input with
delayed master file update or batch data entry
with delayed master file update are discussed
in this chapter. In addition, other operating en
vironments are described even though they are
not ordinarily thought of as on-line; each has
some unique characteristics in addition to
those described in chapter 2. Their effect on
the auditor and on additional control considera
tions is discussed.
Types of on-line processing environments
described in this chapter include—
• On-line data entry.
• Batch transaction input and delayed master
file update.
• Single transaction input with delayed master
file update.
• Remote job entry.
• On-line processing at a service center.
Telecommunications and data base sys
tems are often encountered as part of on-line
environments, and therefore they will be briefly
described to familiarize the reader with their
operations. The addition of telecommunications
and data base environments to on-line systems
does not affect the application control objec
tives but may have some effect on the control
procedures used to achieve those objectives.
However, the effect of telecommunications and
data base environments on the system of inter
nal accounting control is beyond the scope of
this document.
On-Line Data Entry. Some on-line systems are
used exclusively to convert source transactions
into machine readable form, thereby replacing
data entry machines and punched cards.
These systems are commonly called key-todiskette or key-to-tape systems. The storage
media containing the input transactions are
generally used by a second computer to pro
cess and update master files in the batch mode.

There are both nonintelligent and intelligent on
line data entry systems. In a nonintelligent sys
tem, editing of transactions takes place on the
second computer. With the use of intelligent
terminals, transactions are edited when they
are entered. When batch data entry is used,
updating of the master files is delayed. Memo
updating of master files may be used to make
information immediately available for inquiries
or reports.
Batch Transaction input and Delayed Master
File Update. In some on-line systems, input
data is submitted in batches and processed at
a later time. This is almost identical to batch
processing except that users control the data
input and editing.
Additional control procedures are neces
sary to ensure that all data received by the
on-line system is passed to and processed by
the batch system. For example, run-to-run con
trols could be used to ensure that the number
of transactions processed by the batch system
equals the number of transactions received by
the on-line data entry system. During batch
processing, incomplete or erroneous transac
tions should be logged and removed from the
batch system. Controls should be implemented
to ensure that all errors are corrected immedi
ately and re-entered into the system.
Single Transaction Input with Delayed Mas
ter File Update. In this processing mode, often
referred to as memo update (as distinguished
from the delayed master file update discussed
in chapter 2), input data is immediately pro
cessed, thus making the effect of processing
these transactions on current master file infor
mation available for inquiry. The master files
that are updated are copies of actual master
files. The same input data that is recorded in
the system during the day is later used to up
date the original copies of the master files.
Therefore, application controls should be im
plemented to ensure that processing occurs
against the correct version of the file and that
all files are properly balanced.
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Remote Job Entry. Remote job entry (RJE) is
the method of entering job information and
data to the main computing system from a re
mote device. These devices are usually card or
diskette readers. Remote job entry allows var
ious users to share the resources of a batchoriented computer by giving them access to
centrally located data files, programs, and
processing facilities. It allows input of a batch
job by a data entry device at a remote site and
receipt of the output on printers, punched
cards, or diskettes at the remote site. For ex
ample, a plant or office geographically remote
from the central computer can load a batch of
transactions, transmit them to the computer,
and get back the results by mail or by direct
transmission to a printer at the remote site.
Remote job entry systems are not limited
to application processing. The remote device
may function in essentially the same way as
the on-site devices used by the computer op
erator. The user may submit application pro
grams, call operating system utilities, submit
transactions for processing, and initiate or
change job control procedures. Significant ex
posure to errors or irregularities may result
from unlimited access and unauthorized use of

such computer resources from the remote site.
However, many of the access controls de
scribed in chapter 3 can be implemented to
restrict and control functions at remote loca
tions.
On-Line Processing at a Service Center. On
line processing at a service center (including
time-sharing) is similar to in-house, on-line
processing, except that computer resources
provided to the user are owned by someone
else and users share the computer simultane
ously with users from other organizations. In
this environment the user cannot affect the
general controls that are implemented by the
service center in the data processing facility.
Off-premises data processing does not al
ter the auditor’s responsibility to study and
evaluate the procedures and controls within the
data processing facility. If a review of controls
relating to off-premises data processing is con
sidered necessary, a cost-effective alternative
to the auditor performing his own review would
be to obtain a special-purpose report on the
service center’s internal controls, prepared by
another auditor. Guidance on the use of such
reports is included in the audit guide entitled
Audits of Service-Center-Produced Records.

Data Base
A data base is a form of file structure that is
controlled by software commonly known as
Data Base Management Systems (DBMS).
DBMS reduces the inefficient storage of redun
dant data by centralizing the data resource.
DBMS software is usually provided by the
computer manufacturer or an independent soft
ware vendor. In some organizations the re
sponsibility for designing the structure and
content of data in a data base environment is
centralized under a data base administration
(DBA) function.

The DBA function is responsible for coordi
nation of data base-related activities and may
be assigned certain control responsibilities,
such as password assignments. If a formal
DBA function is used, this responsibility should
be performed by someone independent of the
programming and operations functions. Users
remain the owners of their data and are still
responsible for controlling the accuracy and
completeness of processing. In a data base
system, application programs only access that
portion of the file defined by the program.

Telecommunications
Telecommunications involves the transmission of
information between remote terminals and the
computer or between two computers. The intro
duction of communications into the on-line en
vironment in turn introduces two new pieces of
equipment: Modems are required to translate
data so that there is compatibility between
computers and devices located at remote loca
tions; in addition, carriers (such as telephone
lines) are required to send and receive com
munications signals.
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The software that often controls the trans
mission of data is provided by the computer
manufacturer or a software vendor. Such soft
ware is frequently designed to detect and re
port errors that occur within transmissions.
When there are errors in the transmission of
data and the software detects them, the soft
ware will normally retransmit the data. In other
systems these control functions may be per
formed by hardware.

CHAPTER 6

Other Concerns
Introduction
On-line systems are quite complex from a data
processing hardware point of view. They pro
vide access to (and, in the case of real time,
update of) master files on an almost immediate
basis. This sophisticated capability results in
unique security exposures that require—
• Backup and recovery procedures and re

lated contingency planning in the event of
physical destruction.
• Special procedures to ensure privacy.
Both of these requirements will be briefly de
scribed in this chapter. More thorough cover
age is documented elsewhere, as indicated in
the bibliography.

Backup and Recovery
Physical security may prevent the accidental or
intentional destruction of data; however, in the
event of physical destruction (such as fires or
floods), provision should be made for recovery
of records and continuity of operations. Special
on-line backup and recovery planning should
consider—
• Computer hardware.
• Current system and application software.
• Appropriate master and transaction files as
well as documentation and supplies that are
normally included in a batch backup envi
ronment.
To try and quantify the operational impact
of losing on-line capabilities, a company
should perform a risk analysis. The risk analy
sis should measure the length of time the com
pany could continue to operate normally if it
were to lose its on-line processing capabilities.
The difference in impact on those systems that
use only inquiry versus inquiry and update ca
pabilities should be considered. Since the loss
of certain on-line systems could be potentially
disastrous (for example, a life-support system
in a hospital or an air traffic control system),
they may require completely redundant sys
tems to serve as backups. In the typical finan
cial application, however, providing selective
duplicate hardware or merely a multiprocess
ing system would be sufficient to provide ade
quate backup capabilities.
Total destruction of an on-line installation is
a possibility, and it may be a serious threat to

the entity’s continuity of operations. Manage
ment should consider the following processing
alternatives:
• Manual processing
• Use of another data processing center’s
hardware
• Vendor support
• Provision for exclusive or shared computer
hardware backup
Each of these alternatives has its own limita
tions and should be evaluated in light of the
entity’s needs. For example, even if an agree
ment with another installation exists and is
tested, it may be difficult to add a full data
processing schedule to an already existing
schedule at the backup site.
Guidance regarding the use of business
interruption or special data processing risk in
surance to cover the cost of restoring EDP
operations is included in the AICPA Audit and
Accounting Guide entitled The Auditor's Study
and Evaluation of Internal Control in EDP Sys
tems.
Contingency plans should be made for re
covery alternatives. Such plans should be doc
umented and distributed to all affected parties.
Both data processing and user personnel
should be involved in the development of such
a plan, and the plan should be reviewed by
internal auditors and accepted by manage
ment. Testing of the contingency plan is impor
tant and should involve both data processing
and user personnel. Testing should include
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procedures that will be followed in-house as
well as those at the alternative site. Particular
emphasis should be given to the practicality of

the plan’s timing estimates that must be met to
recover processing capabilities.

Privacy
Management should consider the following cri
teria to provide for privacy or protection of in
formation contained within their system:
•
•
•
•

Legislative enactment
Administrative policy
Computer system design
Physical location of computer (to include on
line terminals)

Just as a risk analysis was recommended in
the ‘‘Backup and Recovery” section, one
should also be performed for privacy expo
sures. Resources required to ensure total pri
vacy are probably not cost-effective. Certain
users (such as those with national security in
terests) rely on encryption, which makes data
unreadable to a person who does not have
access to the key. In an on-line environment,
users of financial systems should consider in
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put security control objectives for terminals, de
tailed in chapter 3, to evaluate potential privacy
penetration.
Technical controls for ensuring the privacy
of data in an on-line environment include—
• Positive identification of terminals (transmis
sion of name, identification, and/or security
code from a tamper-proof circuit).
• Positive terminal identification guards (such
as prevention of polling address errors,
faulty line switching, deliberate switching of
terminal connections, and unauthorized ac
cess to the system).
• Positive identification of terminal users (by
something the user must know or memorize,
such as a password, or by what the user
must carry, such as a key or a card).
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